The U.S., through NASA and the U.S. Space Force, should engage in specific cislunar activity in order to keep up with other countries’ technology, monitor cislunar space activity of other countries, improve space domain awareness, protect U.S. missions in cislunar space, and create a less vulnerable situation for the U.S. in space by utilizing cislunar space for critical space assets [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. China is already utilizing cislunar space, having positioned a data relay satellite outside of the crowded LEO and GEO environments, making their intelligence less vulnerable to jamming and targeting, and less vulnerable to space debris [2]. China is also conducting activities on the moon, which the U.S. doesn’t have capability to effectively monitor [6]. China and Russia have discussed working together to explore cislunar space, and given the current climate of international tension and potential for conlift, the U.S. should utilize cislunar space to help create a more robust space infrastructure for data relay and to monitor the cislunar environment [2].
With NASA’s Artemis program on the horizon and private companies looking to mine resources on the moon, the U.S. might have to contend with conflict in cislunar space in the future [3]. Because of this, the U.S. should assess what types of protection NASA’s Artemis mission, private industry, and future government missions may need, and plan accordingly [3]. As the branch of the U.S. military charged with overseeing space, USSF should play a role in protecting civilian and economic cislunar activity, as well as utilizing cislunar space to improve intelligence, awareness, and protection for the U.S. [4][5][6]. However, taking steps toward any type of militarization in cislunar space could propel other countries to further their own militarization of space, and should be done with caution and diplomacy [8].
NASA’s ability to encourage diplomacy, as with the Artemis project bringing in 26 collaborating countries, should be at the forefront of cislunar space activity [4]. NASA can use this diplomacy to create a set of standard practices for safer cislunar operations among collaborating countries, and can lead the way in peaceful cislunar activity [4]. However, the main challengers to cislunar resources and activities are China, Russia, and India, all of whom have not joined the list of collaborators for Artemis [6]. This puts NASA, the Artemis project, and private industry at risk when it comes to cislunar activity, setting up a presence on the moon, and mining lucrative resources [6]. Resources such as water, Helium-3, and rare earth metals, will provide a significant advantage and profit to whichever country or set of collaborators are able to mine them first [6]. Currently, China is leading the way in cislunar space and conducting activities on the dark side of the moon where U.S. surveillance can’t follow every move, so it’s imperative for the U.S. to, at a minimum, improve its surveillance of cislunar space [6][7].
NASA and Space Force have agreed to work together – sharing capabilities and information – so both entities can better achieve their missions [2][4][5]. Both NASA and Space Force have goals that can’t be achieved with their resources alone, but by sharing their capabilities, they can work toward certain goals such as improving space domain awareness and protecting Earth from dangerous asteroids [5]. NASA and Space Force should continue to collaborate to improve cislunar space surveillance, strategically place cislunar satellites, establish a presence on the moon, and secure the future of resource mining, with NASA leading the way in diplomacy and science, Space Force offering protection and surveillance, and the two working together to improve space domain awareness [6][7]. Whenever possible, NASA should be charged with leading cislunar activities, to prevent military escalation by involving Space Force, whether the threat to other countries is perceived or real [8].
Works Cited
[1] Michael Byers and Aaron Boley. “Cis-lunar space and the security dilemma.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. January 17, 2022. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-01/cis-lunar-space-and-the-security-dilemma/ (Links to an external site.)
[2] Courtney Albon. “Air Force Research Lab building momentum on cislunar projects.” C4ISRNet. 13 February 2022. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2022/02/13/air-force-research-lab-building-momentum-on-cislunar-projects/ (Links to an external site.)
[3] Laura Duffy and James Lake. “Cislunar Spacepower The New Frontier.” Space Force Journal. 31 December 2021. https://spaceforcejournal.org/3859-2/ (Links to an external site.)
[4] Nathan Strout. “Space Force and NASA focused on cislunar space in new agreement.” C4ISRNet. 22 September 2020. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/09/22/space-force-and-nasa-focused-on-cislunar-space-in-new-agreement (Links to an external site.)
[5] Iwin, Sandra. “NASA affirms partnership with Space Force, Bridenstine stresses value of ‘soft power’.” Space News. 22 September 2020. https://spacenews.com/nasa-affirms-partnership-with-space-force-bridenstine-stresses-value-of-soft-power/ (Links to an external site.)
[6] Leonard David. “Is Earth-moon space the US military's new high ground?” Space.com. 17 September 2020. https://www.space.com/earth-moon-space-us-military-high-ground.html (Links to an external site.)
[7] Mandy Mayfield. “China’s Cislunar Space Ambitions Draw Scrutiny.” National Defense Magazine. 29 May 2020. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/5/29/china-cislunar-space-ambitions (Links to an external site.)
[8] Cremins, Thomas, and Paul D. Spudis. "The Strategic Context of the Moon Echoes of the Past, Symphony of the Future." Astropolitics 5.1 (2007): 87-104.